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PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Ryan v. Ribbeck' was decided on the basis of ten-year good
faith prescription and it was not necessary to go into the validity
of an old slave marriage and its progeny. Plaintiffs challenged
the defendant's good faith on the ground that he had an abstract
of the title which disclosed its defects. The evidence showed that
he had in fact received such an abstract several days after his
purchase but he put it away without reading it. In any case, the
time at which good faith is tested is the time of the purchase,
and here good faith is presumed with the burden of disproving
it on the one who contradicts it. 2 An interesting question is
raised by the error in the editorial head note of the case which
places the receipt of the abstract several days before the sale. If
there is no evidence of his having read it, it is doubtful that the
mere possession of the abstract would be treated as constructive
knowledge of its contents because there is no obligation to make
a title examination in order to be in good faith.3 If the abstract
had been requested and received before the sale, this might be
considered tantamount to a title examination even if the abstract
had not actually been read.
Jacobs v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co.4 discusses sev-
eral points of acquisitive prescription, but the only one which
might need emphasizing in this comment concerns the tax deed
by which property was acquired at a tax sale and which may be
a just title for the ten-year prescription when the deed appears
valid on its face and translative of ownership. This was held to
be so, even where the tax sale resulted from an erroneous assess-
ment while the tax was actually paid under another assessment
of the same property. The court relied upon the earlier case of
Eivers' Heirs v. Rankin's Heirs, where it was stated that "it is
not essential to the purchaser's good faith that he should investi-
gate the assessment rolls or verify the recitals of the tax deed."'
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 624, 83 So.2d 650 (1955).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3481 (1870).
3. Pattison v. Maloney, 38 La. Ann. 885 (1886) ; Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So.2d
68 (La. App. 1942).
4. 228 La. 462, 82 So.2d 765 (1955).
5. 150 La. 4, 9, 90 So. 419, 421 (1922).
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If the tax deed were completely regular in all respects, there
would be real ownership and no need to consider prescription.
Merely because the original error originated in a public office
is no reason why the general principles and rules of acquisitive
prescription should not apply.
MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
In Union Oil Company of California v. Touchet,1 a landowner
sold a 1/32 royalty interest. About five years later he leased
the land. Thereafter, the lease was amended to give the lessee
the right to pool the tract without further consent from the
lessor and to allocate production on an acreage basis. A gas well
was brought in in the vicinity within ten years from the royalty
sale but was shut in for lack of market. A unit was then created
and recorded, including this well and the tract affecting the
royalty in question. The lands of a third person were also in-
cluded but not listed in the recorded instrument. After ten years
from the royalty sale, permission to include the lands of the
third person was secured. A declaration of unitization, reciting
the tract of the third person but otherwise identical with the
first declaration, was then recorded. The Commissioner of Con-
servation authorized production from the shut-in gas well and
dispute arose regarding ownership of the 1/32 royalty. Had pro-
duction occurred within the ten year period on the tract carry-
ing the royalty, the vendees would have been unquestionably
entitled to their share. Since that event had not happened, their
claim must rest upon the first unit declaration. The court found
that despite the very broad power given by the amended lease
provision on pooling, the provision could only mean that the
lessee might unitize with other leases over which similar power
had been given. As outlined above, the unit declaration upon
which the royalty claim depended included the land of a third
person who had not at that time given consent and thus the
*Permission has been granted by Matthew Bender and Company to use certain
cases reported herein as have been reported by the writer in the Oil and Gaa
Reporter, sponsored by the Southwest Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas, and
published by that company.
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1. 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956).
[Vol. XVII
